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Introduction 
 
The general thesis I wish to explore here is that the peculiar forms 
of contemporary national Third Sectors which, according to 
Salamon (1993) are currently spreading around the world arose in 
a unique historical moment and are unlikely to outlast that 
moment in history. It may indeed be true, as I and others have 
argued, that certain features of the contemporary Third Sector 
(particularly those I have labeled commons) are more or less 
permanent features of human community. (Lohmann, 1992) 
However, self-help and mutual aid groups, voluntary associations, 
social movement organizations and the like are not generally seen 
as the principal or defining characteristics of the contemporary 
Third Sector, Instead, the sector is seen as consisting of – and 
defined by – paid employment in tax-exempt “nonprofit”, 
“voluntary” or “nongovernment” organizations, charged with 
vending services to defined and recognized clientele and 
supported partly or wholly by public funding. In brief, if this 
particular Third Sector configuration were to prove long-lasting, 
it must be deemed an entirely new form of public management by 
essentially private entities. 
Failure Theory 
Any conclusions about the permanency of change represented by 
the hegemony within the Third Sector of nonprofit organizations, 
however, must consider the unique national circumstances under 
which these organizations are arising in various nation states. In 
the case of the United States, for example, the rise of this putative 
Third Sector was a unique and momentary product of late 20th 
century American public life.  Conditions are already developing 
to transform this particular configuration into something new, 
different, and perhaps unrecognizable. Thus, it is quite 
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appropriate to ask whether there has been another transformation 
in the particular circumstances that brought the recent 
proliferation of nonprofit corporations and whether that change is 
sufficient to lead to the demise in the near future of the nonprofit 
sector as we have come to know it? 
Something approaching a consensus appears to exist among 
American Third Sector scholars that the rise of a sector of more 
than a million nonprofit organizations and at least 40,000 
donative foundations is due in large part to twin failures of 
government (“state failure”) and business (“market failure”). 
These twin failures, together with the enduring characteristics of 
information asymmetry, the behaviorism of incentive theory and 
legal and ethical non-distribution constraints are the cornerstones 
of third sector theory in its present state. 
The Nonprofit Sector Model 
Viewing the Third Sector as a strictly contemporary phenomenon 
gives a hard edge to Peter Dobkin Hall’s assertion that the 
American nonprofit sector came into being only in recent decades 
in the wake of the Filer Commission. (Hall, 1992) It seems clear 
that the term nonprofit sector as ordinarily used by researchers in 
economics, public policy, and the sociology of organizations is a 
largely ethnocentric term, indigenous to the English speaking, or 
Anglo nations of the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia and 
New Zealand, and to a lesser degree, the developed nations of the 
industrialized world.  
Its export to the rest of the world is often treated as a 
straightforward issue of “technology transfer”; an approach that 
conveniently glosses over a number of complex and difficult 
cultural and political issues. It is from this First World base that 
Salamon (1993) has detected an international associational 
revolution in terms of the diffusion of American-style nonprofit 
corporations/organizations to the rest of the world.  
Nonprofit sector is also a largely contemporaneous term, both in 
usage and in meaning, containing no explicit reference to the past, 
and no future connotations other than Whiggish continuity. 
Protests that charitable, philanthropic and associational activities 
existed prior to the Filer Commission miss the essential point: 
There may have been (indeed, there were) other related 
phenomena in other places and in other times, but the 
contemporary term Third Sector as it is ordinarily used does not 
extend to them. The terms Nonprofit and Third Sector, as they are 
currently used, do not purport to cover the entire history of 
human association in all human cultures, or the full scope of 
charity, philanthropy, self-help and volunteering in past, present 
or future. These terms are, and should continue to be, narrower 
references to particular, post-war national regimes.  
The Nonprofit Sector is a socio-economic world of professionally 
staffed nonprofit organizations, legally organized as tax-exempt 
nonprofit corporations and operating on the basis of 
distributionally-constrained managerial entrepreneurship, and 
with revenue streams derived in significant degree from public-
sector grants, contracts and transfer payments, just as its 
adherents suggest. It is also a world in which entrepreneurs who 
create and work for nonprofit corporations may choose to take 
advantage of available tax exemptions and to cloak their activities 
(whether authentically or disingenuously) in the rhetoric of 
charity and philanthropy. All of this offers no great mystery.  
Moreover, the fact that these contemporary national Third Sectors 
have largely become the domain of organizational entrepreneurs 
should surprise no one familiar with the history of public 
management. Such entrepreneurs have been attracted by a broad 
range of public transfer payments to create charitable, 
philanthropic, volunteer, and other programs. Incentive theory is 
one of the bastions on which entrepreneurial Third Sector 
ideology was built, and public transfer payments offer a 
particularly attractive set of incentives. In fact, declines in 
available transfer payments to nonprofit corporations can be 
considered one of the surest predictors of future declines in this 
Third Sector. 
Alternative Futures 
I have tried in various ways during the past decade to articulate 
the view that the Nonprofit Sector conceived in this manner, is 
simply one of several subclasses of a larger and more enduring 
category of human voluntary association over time and across 
cultures. Because this larger class of associations has no generally 
accepted name, I sought to apply the term commons. From this 
vantage point, the formal, nonprofit, professionally-staffed 
organizations in the current Third Sector are one of the members 
of a larger class of social organizations which also includes 
hunting, gathering and war parties of primitive cultures; the 
confraternities and guilds of medieval Europe; the scientific 
academies of the 17th century, the coffeehouses of 18th century 
London to which Habermas (1989) traces the origins of modern 
publics, the voluntary associations observed by Tocqueville, the 
voluntary agencies of the late 19th and early 20th century, the 
waqfs of the Arab world, Buddhist monastic organizations, 
(Lohmann, 1995a; 1997), Maori morais, Central American fiesta 
organizations (Brass, 1986;Smith, 1977), and many more 
examples.  
Just as we have no generally accepted name for this larger class of 
organizations that includes nonprofit organizations, we similarly 
have no name for the larger classes of culture complexes or 
regimes in which they are embedded. Extending the terms 
Nonprofit or Third Sector indiscriminately to the entire class of 
organizations or to the class of regimes merely serves to mask 
over very real differences between them and the specific, 
contemporary regime of the nonprofit sector and lead to no end of 
confusion and pointless debate.  
Unlike the American voluntary associations cited by de 
Tocqueville or the European confraternities of medieval 
Christendom, the contemporary nonprofit organizations of the 
Third Sector, do not strike me as particularly definitive members 
of this larger class nor as constituting a particularly definitive 
regime. (That is to say, neither is an ideal type in the Weberian 
sense.) Because of their origins in the failures of state and market 
in the welfare state “mixed economy”, both may be thought of 
more accurately as marginal phenomena or amalgams; admixtures 
of characteristic traits of state, market and commons. 
The contemporary Nonprofit Sector deserves to be seen, as Hall 
suggests, as a new and distinct phenomenon. To fully accept this 
view, however, is also to recognize that the contemporary 
Nonprofit Sector should be seen as a secondary institutional 
phenomenon. One simply cannot have it both ways: If the third 
sector is as its adherents present it, a product of the recent 
moment, then it is also not a foundational social and political 
complex like the family, state, market or civil society. Our 
collective social life has not been fundamentally transformed by 
the emergence of this third sector in the way, for example, that it 
was by the historic emergence of the political state or the market. 
Instead, the third sector represents a socio-economic complex 
located at the margins of contemporary state and market civil 
society. It is an expression of contemporary civil society which 
survives largely because of protection and subsidy by the state 
and the apparent attractiveness of its attractive economic 
incentives it creates in certain (e.g., labor) markets. 
From this vantage point, this American Nonprofit Sector looks 
less and less like any type of enduring social reality, and more 
and more like a macro-social episode.  It may be a unique macro-
event in the post-war world resulting perhaps from post-war 
economic growth; the restless idealism of the Kennedy years; a 
male-WASP political elite in decline; the baby boom-inspired 
need to expand employment opportunities; the interest-group 
liberalism of national politics; the growth of health care spending; 
the backlash against government, combined with healthy doses of 
opportunism toward the traditional legal backwaters of state 
nonprofit law and the arcane complexities of corporate tax law, 
together with large measures of adventurism, chicanery and 
innovation.  
 
The Decline and Fall of  
The Nonprofit Sector? 
A unique set of historical circumstances over the past two decades 
caught the attention of students of the nonprofit sector in 
economics and the management disciplines and proponents of 
voluntary action in sociology, social work and political science 
and fostered attempts (still incomplete and open-ended) to 
develop convergent, multi-disciplinary paradigms of the nonprofit 
sector. Subtle but important disciplinary and theoretical 
differences in unit of analysis (corporation, organization, 
association, group, etc.), time frame (specious present, past, or in 
this case future), intent (pure research or practice) and other 
issues were set aside as immediate contemporary concerns were 
explored. 
The is room here for the positions of Salamon,  Hall and Smith: 
(Hall, 1992; Smith, 199X) While voluntary action may fluctuate 
across time, it is as an essential characteristic of the human 
condition even more fundamental than, and underlying, market 
trading or political states and will always be with us to one degree 
or another. By contrast, the Third Sector and the resulting 
questions over nonprofit behavior and nonprofit organization 
result from a unique historical configuration which arose out of 
the particular political circumstances which Theodore Lowi has 
characterized as interest group liberalism (1969) and, more 
recently, late Second Republic decadence (1994). Michael Sandel 
(1996) has characterized this as the rise of the Procedural 
Republic.  Robert Samuelson (1995) sees it in terms of the rise of 
a pernicious political culture of “entitlement” in which citizens (in 
a reversal of the famous call to public service issued by President 
Kennedy in 1960) ask not what they can do for their country, but 
rather what their country can do for them. 
At this time, it is not at all difficult to visualize a relatively large 
number of present and foreseeable conditions leading to the 
demise of substantial portions of this American Nonprofit Sector. 
Unfavorable tax rulings, cuts in public subsidies and tighter 
enforcement of tax-exempt status are just three of a broad range 
of circumstances which could easily bring such a change. 
Nonprofit corporations are easily created. They just as easily 
disappear. If enough of them disappear, so apparently does the 
sector, at least as it is presently conceived. In the remainder of 
this paper, I want to concentrate on a number of factors and 
forces associated with the creation of the Third Sector that are 
currently pointing toward its demise.  
Government Failure 
In the usual constructions, one of the factors out of which the 
contemporary Third Sector of nonprofit organizations is said to 
have risen is government failure. (Salamon, 1987) However, most 
accounts of these failures are not very specific about what 
particular failures of government were actually involved. Let us 
attempt to be somewhat clearer:  
Institutional failure is a rather peculiar basis from which to begin 
theorizing the Third Sector, as I noted in an article a number of 
years ago. (Lohmann, 1989) However, once such a course is set, 
it is somewhat disingenuous not to clearly identify the specific 
market and state failures that gave rise to the armada of nonprofit 
organizations which currently dominate the third sector. For 
example, welfare state theory is premised upon the failure of 
market mechanisms to protect the wellbeing of workers and 
consumers. And, in turn, it was perceived failures of public 
management that have given rise to the sustained assault by the 
new right upon government institutions of all types. So much 
seems clear. 
Is seems equally clear that the original ‘sector’ of American 
voluntary associations which Tocqueville observed in the North 
America of the 1840’s was also subject to institutional failures. 
We might summarize these as the failure of medieval European 
systems of aristocratic patronage, and church-sanctioned 
community and charity organization to take hold in the new 
world. Much of what Tocqueville observed amounts to a report of 
his sense of wonder that associations of commoners in everyday 
life could occur without aristocratic protection and beneficence or 
the institutional legitimation of church or state. This form of 
argument is inherently tautological. In this same sense, virtually 
any type of social change can be reconstructed as the failure of 
conditions in effect prior to the change.  
It was not any particular parliamentary, legislative or judicial 
failures or ineffective public management, nor recognition of any 
such failures by reform or study commissions, to which we can 
properly trace the rise of nonprofit organizations in the American 
third sector of the 1960’s and 1970’s. In the first instance, it was 
the legislative successes of President Lyndon Johnson in the wake 
of the Kennedy assassination that both created the diverse 
discretionary grant programs and devised the legal apparatus 
whereby nonprofit “community” groups could apply for and 
received public funds independently. (Unger, 1996).  
In a second stage of privatization, the administration of Richard 
Nixon later extended this same eligibility to private, for-profit 
groups. A vast range of pseudo-markets were thereby created in 
which large groups of service-consumers are aided in purchasing 
health, social and other services from large groups of commercial 
vendors through public subsidies from a single faux-buyer: the 
federal government.  
The role of public management failures is somewhat more 
complex in the American case. For some time now, politicians 
and journalists have been blaming “bureaucrats” for many of the 
ills of the world. However, it was not the putative evils of 
bureaucracy, but rather constitutional limits and the 
characteristics of budget politics of the federal bureaucracy 
during the 1950s and 1960s that gave rise to the organizational 
third sector. (Wildavsky, 1967) 
One plausible approach is to argue that the most significant 
governmental failure was the inability of federal bureaus (such as 
those reorganized into the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare during the 1950 s) to muster sufficient support in the 
Congressional budget process and Constitutional limits which 
restricted the abilities of these same bureaus to develop and 
administer service programs of their own . In the post-war 
decades during which the Third Sector is said to have arisen, 
these same federal agencies could not look to state and local 
government for support. As Lowi (1994) notes, American state 
and local governments were during that time collectively the 
traditionalist bastion of the very same “old order” (i.e., 
traditionalist) conservatism which formed the base for opposition 
to these federal programs.  
Anyone who was alive at the time surely remembers the role of 
southern governors, legislators and local governments in leading 
the opposition to civil rights reforms, for example. Institutional 
racism in this sense did not come from the people, but directly 
from state and local government. How, then, could progressive 
forces introduce and institutionalize change with protectors of the 
existing order in every city hall, courthouse and state capital? At 
least part of the answer was to be found in the resurgence of the 
doctrine of local community and specific, newly (and under state 
laws, easily) created nonprofit corporations which could be (and 
was) used to by-pass the traditionalist state-local political 
structure entirely. To some extent, this configuration continues: It 
was the state governors who led the recently successful initiative 
for “welfare reform”, for example. 
As the Johnson Administration demonstrated clearly with the 
Community Action Phase of the War on Poverty,  grants and later 
contracting out the actual delivery of services to nonprofit 
organizations could by-pass the opposition and create an instant 
constituency of supporters for any program from which funds can 
be distributed. In the name of "the community" similar by-passes 
were arranged through the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, Community Mental Health Centers Act, Older Americans 
Act and other legislative acts of the Great Society.  Throughout 
the period during which the Third Sector is said to have arisen, 
this strategy for compensating for budget and program failures 
that began in the precincts of H.E.W. was passed from federal 
agency to agency, even reaching such bureaus as the U.S. Forest 
Service and the Environmental Protection Agency. In this way, 
hundreds of thousands of nonprofit organizations compensated 
for this particular set of government failures and created one 
important core of the nonprofit sector profile as it is currently 
understood. 
I am tempted to believe that something of the same forces are at 
work in Great Britain, partly because of the parallel 
administrations of Thatcher-Reagan and Clinton-Blair. On C-
Span recently, I watched your prime minister in a ‘town meeting’ 
on crime in the Worchester Town Hall extol the virtues of 
localism and ‘community action.’ 
Perhaps we might conclude from this that the most general 
failures of government which give rise to the contemporary 
national third sectors are failures to know what to do and how to 
muster the political capital to do it in the areas of social policy. In 
this familiar scenario, politicians escape into flights of rhetorical 
excess. They leave the actual working out of policy in areas such 
as families, housing, social care arrangements to the negotiations 
between public bureaucrats and nonprofit administrators. 
While this iron triangle strategy was highly successful in the short 
run, it has also had certain side effects. According to Lowi (1994) 
it succeeded in shifting the balance of power between federal and 
state governments and disrupting the community base of old order 
conservatism. This is one of the enduring discontents with "big" 
government known collectively as the conservative revolution 
which has been largely responsible since 1980 for threatening and 
undermining the funding base of these same government bureaus 
and their Third Sector constituents. Half the recent American 
presidents (Carter, Reagan and Clinton) are former governors.  
Another side effect, noted by Unger (1996) was the 
transformation of opportunities into entitlements which is at the 
core of the current crisis of the American welfare state. 
Among other things, focus on these particular government 
failures explains why privatization which in other nations has 
been largely an issue of the transfer of public assets to private 
owners has, in the United States, been seen more as a quest for 
new (nongovernmental) support for the Third Sector. This 
analysis also explains the otherwise curious reluctance of so many 
of those seeking to define the Third Sector in the United States to 
include the grassroots , voluntary association, fund-raising, social 
movement and other dimensions of the conservative revolution 
within the domain of the Third Sector. This conservative 
revolution may, in fact, successful constrain future development 
of the Third Sector in either of two ways by establishing a new 
regime dramatically limiting the powers and expenditures of 
government, or through the less ambitious oppositional role of 
placing severe practical limits on spending increases and new 
programs. In this way, conservatism does not need to win to 
succeed: Either way, the public revenue streams which form the 
life-blood of what Wolch (1990) has termed the shadow state are 
undercut. Thus, the very forces that for several decades made of 
the nonprofit sector a way of overcoming the particular 
government failures of federalism, traditionalism and 
bipartisanship may in the future result in the undoing of the 
sector. 
The present American Third Sector is, in these rather distinctive 
senses, almost certainly a product of government failures. 
 Correcting Market Failures 
The second major dynamic said to be responsible for the historic 
rise of the Third Sector is market failure. In at least one important 
respect, paid employment, there almost certainly has been no 
failure at all; the nonprofit sector appears to function more or less 
normally in the national labor markets. Unlike voluntary 
associations, clubs, social movements and other actors in 
voluntary action, the nonprofit organizations of the Third Sector 
are, therefore, in at least one important respect inherent parts of 
the overall market structure of national economies. Theoretical 
focus on nonprofit production has generally understated the 
importance of this particular factor. Thus, the continuation of paid 
staff employment in future nonprofit organizations is one measure 
of the continuing success of the sector in staving off market 
failure; not an indicator of such failure. 
Another anticipated market failure may have largely failed to 
materialize at least in part because of the rise of the Third Sector. 
In fact, one of the largely unsung accomplishments of the Third 
Sector may have been its role in absorbing the demographic 
surplus army of (high school and college graduate) baby-boomers 
who entered the labor market during the period of rapid growth of 
the Sector. Earlier expectations of a glut of workers entering the 
labor force in the baby boomer years proved largely unfounded. 
While general expansion of the economy is, no doubt, the most 
important reason, the creation of new jobs in those million 
nonprofit corporations has to be given a measure of credit as well. 
In at least three other distinct but equally important senses, the 
very market failures which are said to have resulted in the rise of 
the Nonprofit Sector could in the future bring nonprofit 
organizations fully back into the marketplace. One pair of such 
market failures is the failure of organizations delivering 
specialized, consumer services as diverse as hospitals, opera and 
ballet companies, and museums to be sufficiently competitive in 
consumer and capital markets to attract sufficient investment to 
underwrite operations and returns on investment. For example, 
high culture has generally been much less successful than 
middlebrow and pop culture in the entertainment marketplace. 
The American Symphony Orchestra League, for example, is one 
of many nonprofit industry groups looking closely at their market 
position, both in labor and capital markets. Like many other 
nonprofit industries, symphony orchestras have generally been 
unsuccessful in pricing their products high enough to cover costs 
and generate profits, yet low enough to attract broad customer 
bases. 
An unrelated third market failure that appears only in retrospect is 
the inability or unwillingness of capital markets to respond to 
basic demographic changes in society. These include the 
declining youth market in the wake of the baby boom and the rise 
of elderly consumers and the identification and definition of other 
new classes of consumers. Public funding of nonprofit service 
industries in these cases has served to demonstrate both that 
potential untapped markets existed and to define entirely new 
markets.  
Despite the vaunted adventurism and allegedly restless 
entrepreneurial spirit of private enterprise, venture capitalists 
often proved to be remarkably unimaginative during the 
formative period of the nonprofit sector. Thus, for example, it 
was only after the efficacy of a series of specific service products 
like hospice, home health care or meals on wheels were defined, 
refined and market-proven by nonprofit vendors that private, 
commercial delivery of such services begin to emerge. Even 
today it is still unclear whether some of these markets (e.g., 
nursing homes and home health care) could be sustained on a 
purely private, competitive basis, or whether public third-party 
funds are necessary to sustain pseudo-markets for these services. 
(Where the latter proves to be the case, of course, much of the 
current rhetoric for privatization American-style simply 
disappears.) 
 
Service Marketization 
In any event, all three of these types of market failures seem to 
point directly to the eventual demise of the present Nonprofit 
Sector through processes resulting in corrections of the specific 
market failures which led to the rise of the sector. We hear a great 
deal today about the role of venture capital in the computer 
software and information processing industries. Less clear has 
been the role of public funding of the Third Sector as a distinctive 
form of public venture capitalization of new markets. What is 
involved here might be seen as a three-stage process, labeled with 
the inelegant term "marketization." The marketization process 
begins with public venture capitalization (grants and contracts to 
nonprofit organizations) and leads to increasingly clear product 
definition and private market formation. Public funding of the 
Third Sector has provided the initial capitalization for a 
staggering variety of products and services, many of which 
simply disappeared after an initial subsidy ran out, but others of 
which were clarified into distinct consumer products currently 
being marketed privately in newly emergent markets. Much of the 
private market in child day care services, for example, is 
following the patterns set out by the federally subsidized Head 
Start program. 
For at least some of the goods and services capitalized through 
the grant funding operations associated with state failure , the 
next step is oblivion. Generally speaking, the rhetoric of 
demonstration projects , innovation and social change 
surrounding public programs for the past three decades has tended 
to ignore or downplay their role in marketizing new services. 
One interesting aspect of this phenomenon which nonprofit 
administrators have generally failed to heed is the way in which 
parallels between market success and support for public funding 
can adversely affect public as well as private support. It is not 
only the useless, pointless and trivial which can fall victim to this 
process, however. If, in the long run, a market fails to coalesce 
around a product created in this way, not only is its marketability 
impaired. The very fact of its failure in the marketplace casts new 
doubts on its continuing legitimacy as an object of public support 
as well. Thus, the success of some museums and symphony 
orchestras in using public funds to leverage commercially 
successful events may put additional pressures on others use of 
public funds to support experimental or other non-commercially 
viable events. If enough people don t want to buy tickets, it is 
said, how worthy can the event be? In much the same vein, the 
commercial successes of some initiatives in health and human 
services have placed increasing pressures on all service providers 
to ignore, neglect or under-serve the poorest, most difficult and 
riskiest patients and clients and are eroding the long-term 
legitimacy of efforts to work with these groups. 
However, some ideas that receive funding are sufficiently 
practical, useful or interesting that they attract widespread interest 
and result in the formation of actual product markets where none 
previously existed. There may be no clearer case of this than 
federally funded Meals on Wheels, a small program of a few 
million dollars first introduced under Title III of the Older 
Americans Act. By the late 1960 s, home-deliveries of food, 
whether raw or prepared, had almost ceased in the U.S. But 
consumers whose parents or grandparents received prepared, 
home-delivered meals probably formed the original core of the 
market for home-delivered pizzas, which has since broadened out 
into home, hotel, office and athletic field delivery of an amazing 
variety of food products on a strictly commercial basis.  
Similar observations can be made about products as diverse as the 
Jeep and Hum-Vee to freeze-dried ice cream. Markets have also 
emerged in recreation services for older people, homemaker and 
home health care services, and other examples where the market 
potential was recognized only after the product was defined or 
marketized by publicly funded programs.  
 
Conclusion: Nonprofit Obsolescence? 
Close examination of the government and market failures which 
are credited with leading to the rise of the Nonprofit Sector shows 
that both sets of failures are proving to be, to some degree, self-
correcting. Thus, the governmental failures of budget 
constituency and limits on service provision which led to the rise 
of interest group liberalism (Lowi, 1969) and the shadow state 
(Wolch, 1990) that we know as The Third Sector also led 
eventually to Reaganomics, the Gingrich revolution of 1994, and 
the protests against tax exemption, charity fraud and other 
questions which leave the long term existence of The Sector very 
much in doubt. 
There may, in fact, be something of an iron law at work here that 
points to the inevitable demise of the Third Sector, or at least, 
major portions of it. Public subsidy of nonprofit activity in the 
Third Sector form of specific responses to capital and product 
market failures of seemingly desirable objectives may set off a 
series of marketization dynamics resulting in the eventual 
commercialization of that product or service. Marketization may 
also undermine the long-term legitimacy as other, similar objects 
of public support which are not a commercial success. Either way, 
the third sector loses in the end: If a product or service created by 
public subsidy of the Third Sector is successful commercially, 
there is no need for continued support of its nonprofit production, 
and if it is not commercially successful, how can continued public 
support be justified?  
Thus, if one looks to the government and market failure 
arguments as the source of the particular configuration of 
nonprofit enterprise we currently call the third sector, one can 
also see that the very forces that led to the rise of the third sector 
are currently pointing toward its decline. Such a decline, if it 
occurs, is a process that can be expected to unfold along lines 
dictated by state and market forces, and have little if anything to 
do with developments in the commons. 
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